Michael Augustín*
Bratislava

The Helsinki Process during the CSCE Chairmanship of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic in 1992: from Prague to Helsinki

Abstract

The Helsinki process underwent a significant transformation after the fall of the Iron Curtain. The early 1990s were marked by the institutionalization and enlargement of the CSCE. The destabilization of several regions and the outbreak of armed conflicts led to an expansion of the agenda and activities within the CSCE structures. In 2022 it was exactly 30 years since the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic held the CSCE chairmanship. In our article, we provide an overview of how the Czechoslovak chairmanship took place in this specific context, the priorities it addressed, and the significant events that marked it.

Keywords: the CSCE, the Helsinki process, Jiří Dienstbier, Václav Havel, Nagorno-Karabakh

Introduction

In Europe after 1990, the political agenda was shaped around questions over the future architecture of European security. The fall of the Iron Curtain dramatically changed the geopolitical situation, bringing important challenges to the states that had belonged to the Warsaw Pact and the members of NATO. Both groups had in common that they were signatory parties of the Helsinki Act and, thus, participating states in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). At last, the CSCE platform – a product of the détente period – could become the ground on which new security concepts, visions, and political ambitions were born. The 1990s thus marked a new beginning for the CSCE. The institutionalization of the Helsinki process went hand in hand with its expansion to new participating states; this meant a complete change in its understanding.

* Institute of Political Sciences, Slovak Academy of Sciences, Bratislava / Faculty of International Relations, University of Economics in Bratislava, Slovak Republic; email: michael.augustin@savba.sk, ORCID 0000-0003-2104-5649
of its mission, a transformation in its functions, and, finally, the granting of new tasks. The political and social changes required the building of the foundations for a new paradigm for the Helsinki process. The understanding of security expanded from a narrow military concept, and commitments related to reducing the arsenal of strategic weapons, to include other areas – the democratization process, the rights of ethnic minorities, and environmental issues.

The CSCE Paris Summit, hosted by President François Mitterand at the Élysée Palace on November 19–21, 1990, marked a turning point in the organization’s history. The discussions led to the establishment of permanent institutions and operational capacities. The Paris Charter for a New Europe created an institution of biennial follow-up meetings at the highest political level, and a Council of Ministers composed of foreign ministers, to meet at least once a year. Furthermore, the political leaders agreed to create a Committee of Senior Officials (CSO), which would prepare the work of the Council of Ministers (CM), implement its decisions, and assess current issues. The Paris Charter established a Secretariat based in Prague, a Centre for Conflict Prevention in Vienna, and an Office for Free Elections in Warsaw. It also created the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly, regrouping members of the parliaments of all participating states. The commitments arising from the Charter had a significant impact on the political and security situation of Eastern Europe, helping to strengthen transition processes and support Eastern European countries toward democratic development. Creating permanent bodies for political dialogue and cooperation in Europe led to greater integration of Eastern European countries into European structures and strengthened regional stability and security. Overall, the CSCE Paris Summit represented a crucial milestone for Eastern Europe.

In Berlin, the CM, at its first meeting in June 1991, decided that its next meeting would be held in Prague. It was an extraordinary moment for post-communist Czechoslovak diplomacy, as the CM entrusted the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR) with the CSCE Chairmanship for the following year. Czechoslovakia thus became the first post-communist country to chair the CSCE. The political representatives expected that the Prague meeting would continue to develop the functional mechanisms and institutional capacity of the new CSCE institutions. In 2022, exactly 30 years have passed since the CSFR Chairmanship. As we perceive a gap here in the academic literature, we aspire to evaluate this period retrospectively and gain a more profound insight into the Helsinki process from the perspective of Czechoslovak diplomacy and its political representatives in that period.

A new understanding of security resulted in the formulation of new approaches in the second half of the 20th century. The concept of cooperative security, emerging as a complementary strategy to collective security and collective defense, aimed to prevent conflicts that could grow to larger dimensions. The concept of cooperative security reached the height of its popularity at the turn of the 1980s and 90s, when the atmosphere in international relations

---

foreshadowed the possibility of peaceful cooperation between the former rivals. The CSCE gradually became the embodiment of the cooperative security regime.\textsuperscript{2} It developed its approach to peacekeeping, early-warning systems and other arms control, and confidence- and security-building mechanisms, to enhance regular consultation and reduce the risk of conflict.\textsuperscript{3} The CSCE also began to become an environment that understood security in broader contexts and developed its human, economic and environmental dimensions. For Czechoslovak diplomacy, which was being formed from scratch, trying to redefine and confirm the state’s new foreign policy orientation, the CSCE represented an important integration platform and an alternative for ensuring security guarantees after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact.

The most significant events for the future evolution of the Helsinki process took place between January and July 1992; the period covered by this article. The first half of 1992 was the period in which the institutional framework of the CSCE was further developed. At the same time, new conflicts flared up in the participating states, to which the CSCE was supposed to react appropriately. The CSFR, which itself faced internal political problems, and its post-communist diplomatic representatives were invited to deal with the security architecture and seek peaceful solutions for Europe. Therefore, this paper addresses the questions: “What was the specific context in which the CSFR Chairmanship took place?” and “What topics did the CSFR representatives raise, what priorities did they address, and what significant events marked the CSFR Chairmanship?” This article aims to map Czechoslovak diplomatic actors’ political priorities and attitudes during the CSFR Chairmanship in the first half of 1992. We analyze this phase of the Helsinki process, the CSCE’s agenda at that time, and the more comprehensive political and social affairs during the CSFR Chairmanship.

In addition to the secondary literature, this article is built on archival research. We analyzed primary sources representing materials and documents stored at the OSCE Documentation Center in Prague. We worked with state representatives’ speeches, preparatory documents, meeting minutes, decisions, annexes, statements, and other documents. We also conducted supplementary research interviews.

The Second CSCE Council of Ministers Meeting in Prague

At the Second CSCE Council of Ministers Meeting in Prague, Czechoslovakia officially took over the chairmanship from Germany. From its 11-member delegation, Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs Jiří Dienstbier took the position


of CM Chairman-in-Office, and Ján Kubiš became the Chairman of the CSO. At this Ministerial Council, held on January 30 and 31, 1992, 10 post-Soviet republics acceded to the Helsinki Final Act: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine. In addition, Croatia and Slovenia received observer status. The ministerial meeting was also attended by delegations from the UN, the Council of Europe, NATO, and the OECD. The ministers debated the ongoing crisis in Yugoslavia and warned against the further spread of the conflict. The CM also accepted an invitation from Armenia and Azerbaijan to send a rapporteur mission and submit a report on the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh.

The President of the CSFR, Václav Havel, delivered a powerful speech in which he declared that the CSCE had the necessary prerequisites to build a new order and peaceful cooperation. According to Havel, the CSCE should be the highest umbrella of all European integration processes. Havel presented four proposals for the continuation of the Helsinki process: 1) The CSCE’s documents should not have a purely political and moral nature. Instead, they should be characterized by an increasingly large degree of legal binding, acquiring legal force and the character of international treaties. Non-compliance with them should be subject to sanctions. 2) The CSCE should further strengthen its bodies and equip them with more significant powers. It should not be just a debating club that would exhaust itself by forming common positions; nor should it create large bureaucratic bodies without powers. On the contrary, it should have strong bodies without vast apparatuses. Havel suggested creating an executive body similar to the UN Security Council with powers to deploy peacekeeping forces, which the CSCE should undoubtedly create. The German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who proposed the creation of the European Security Council, had similar ideas. Even though these visions were never implemented, they prove that Czechoslovakia’s diplomatic initiatives at the time were similar to the visions of political representatives of key European players. 3) The CSCE should be functionally linked with other European and Euro-Atlantic structures. Havel expressed the desire for NATO to transform, open itself up, and become an instrument for the collective defense of all states of the Helsinki hemisphere. 4) The CSCE must play a unique role in disarmament agreements and control their implementation. The CSCE should consider how to make military and weapons matters more transparent than before, regulate the production and export of weapons, and support the conversion of the arms industry in post-communist countries.

Dienstbier could not present his statement at the meeting due to lack of time, so his text was circulated later to all contact points at the request of the CSFR. He made three main points: 1) Let us not give room to unnecessary discussions about whether the issue of human rights in Europe will be managed by the

---

4 OSCE Documentation Centre in Prague (hereinafter referred to only as “OSCE DCiP”), CSCE/2-C/Dec. 3. Summary of Conclusions, January 31, 1992.
5 Z. Matějka, Povolání diplomat…, Plzeň 2007, p. 139.
6 OSCE DCiP, Statement by H.E. Václav Havel, President of the CSFR.
Council of Europe or the CSCE, or whether the Western European Union (WEU) represents the European pillar of NATO or the security dimension of the European Communities (EC). The CSCE should have its own peacekeeping forces, which would perform their functions through NATO or WEU mechanisms.

2) The accession of 10 new states of the former Soviet Union gives the initial Euro-Atlantic area a new civilizational dimension. The increase in participating states represents an increase in the importance and tasks of the CSCE Secretariat in Prague.

3) Dangerous sources of instability are beginning to appear in Western Europe (racism, xenophobia, violence, and the rise of the extreme right, which has fascist tendencies). Young and fragile democracies in Central and Eastern Europe are at risk of becoming infected with this disease. They have enough enemies and internal problems of their own, so they will be unable to defend themselves against a possible devastating phenomenon coming from the most stable part of Europe.

The conclusions of the Prague CM were elaborated in three documents: the *Summary of Conclusions*, the *Prague Document on Further Development of CSCE Institutions*, and *Structures and Declaration on Non-Proliferation and Arms Transfers*. The *Prague Document* presented the modalities for the Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting scheduled for March. It confirmed the commitment of the participating countries to continue fulfilling the goals of the Paris Charter and their determination to continue to reform the CSCE bodies. The *Summary of Conclusions* shows that the ministers had had a comprehensive discussion about escalating tensions in Yugoslavia. They warned against the further spread of the conflict, and expressed full support for the UN Security Council and the rapid deployment of UN peacekeeping forces based on Security Council Resolution 727, adopted on January 8, 1992. In addition to expressing deep concern about the humanitarian aspects of the crisis, the ministers reminded the responsible actors that acts of violence are personally accountable under international law.

The delegates were also informed of the report of the CSCE human rights rapporteur mission that had visited Yugoslavia; they agreed that the human rights situation in Yugoslavia, including the status of national minorities, should remain under the supervision of the CSCE.

For a long time, the Yugoslavian delegation at CSO meetings had blocked the adoption of documents that might move things forward concerning the changing situation in the Balkans. Progress would only be possible by naming the real causes of the conflict. This problem led the CM to agree on creating a new mechanism, the so-called consensus minus one. This was developed in part four of the Prague document: “Protection of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law.” By weakening the consensus principle of decision-making, the Council increased the CSCE’s ability to act

---

9 OSCE DCoP, CSCE/2-C/Dec. 3.
10 OSCE DCoP, CSCE/2-C/Dec. 3.
11 M. Augustín, 2022.
if there was a clear and serious threat to human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. The new mechanism allowed the CM or the CSO to take appropriate action, if necessary, without the consent of the state concerned.\textsuperscript{12} The CSFR supported the adoption of consensus minus one.\textsuperscript{13}

The Preparatory Meeting for the CSCE Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting

The Preparatory Meeting lasted from March 10 to March 20, 1992. Its main task was to prepare an agenda of organizational requirements for the CSCE Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting. The Czechoslovak delegation consisted of Ivan Bušniak, Jan Pecháček, František Janouch, Roman Hronek, Ivan Majerčín, and Pavol Hamžík.

The Preparatory Meeting decided that the CSCE Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting would work in four working groups and through a plenary session:

- Working Group 1 would address issues related to the further development of CSCE institutions, all mechanisms and tools, external relations, and financial and administrative arrangements.
- Working Group 2 would deal with issues related to the mandate of the emerging CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation.
- Working Group 3 would address issues related to the Human Dimension.
- Working Group 4 would address issues related to cooperation in the fields of economy, science, technology, environment, development of the economies of the countries of the former Eastern bloc, and Mediterranean issues.\textsuperscript{14}

The opening plenary session would start on March 24, and meet, as a rule, once a week. The working groups would start negotiations on March 30 and end before June 19, working from Monday to Friday. The Preparatory Meeting also determined that the formal preparation of the documents to be adopted at the Heads of State or Government Meeting within the framework of the Helsinki Summit would begin on June 22 and end before July 4.\textsuperscript{15}

The Helsinki Additional Meeting of the CSCE Council of Ministers

The deteriorating situation in the South Caucasus necessitated an additional ministerial meeting. In February, delegates at the CSO meeting discussed the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh. They drew on the \textit{Interim Report on the Situation in Nagorno-Karabakh}, which was prepared and submitted by the mission led by Karl Schwarzenberg, then chancellor (director of the CSFR presidential office) to Václav Havel. At the same time, the CSO asked the CM Chairman-in-Office Jiří Dienstbier to actively participate in dialogue with the respective

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{12} OSCE DGiP, CSCE/2-C/Dec. 2. Prague Document on Further Development of CSCE Institutions and Structures.
  \item \textsuperscript{13} M. Augustin, \textit{Interview with Pavol Hamžík, a member of the CSFR delegation at the CSCE in 1992}, February 2, 2022.
  \item \textsuperscript{15} OSCE DGiP, CSCE/HM–P/Dec.2.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
parties to the conflict and, in cooperation with international organizations, to help improve the humanitarian situation in the region.\textsuperscript{16} As a result, the CSO established a second mission to Nagorno-Karabakh at its eighth session on March 13–14, 1992. The mission was tasked with exploring options for ceasefire negotiations and sending observers to monitor the ceasefire. The mission took place on March 19–23, 1992; it was headed by the chairman of the CSO, Ján Kubiš.\textsuperscript{17} Almost simultaneously, at the first additional meeting of the CM of the CSCE in Helsinki on March 24, 1992, the delegates decided that a conference on Nagorno-Karabakh in Minsk under the auspices of the CSCE, with the participation of selected CSCE countries in the role of mediators, would be organized as soon as possible. The conference would represent a forum for further negotiations; “elected and other” representatives of Nagorno-Karabakh would also be invited as one of the interested parties.\textsuperscript{18} In addition, the ministers perceived the need for the CSCE to develop further activities to support the peace process in connection with the development of the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh. Therefore, the CM tasked Dienstbier to personally visit the region and contribute to the establishment of a ceasefire.\textsuperscript{19}

In a speech during the CM Additional Meeting in Helsinki, Dienstbier rejected the idea of focusing only on those international organizations that had the potential to survive and establish themselves in the new conditions. He instead suggested “playing all the cards” that were available. He referred to this form of interaction as “integration of integrations,” because only through contact with other international organizations could the CSCE gain the ability to act effectively and quickly.\textsuperscript{20} Despite political differences, the voice of Czechoslovak diplomacy sounded in unison. President Havel was equally convinced that the functional connection of the CSCE with other existing structures was an important priority; he similarly also believed that the CSCE had the potential to transform into an institution that would guarantee peaceful development in a united Europe.\textsuperscript{21}

Already at the First CM Meeting in Berlin, Dienstbier had supported close interaction between the existing European, Euro-Atlantic structures (the Council of Europe, NATO, WEU, EC) and the CSCE as a necessary prerequisite for building a European system of cooperative security in the new conditions.\textsuperscript{22} In 1991, in an article published in \textit{Foreign Policy}, he developed the contours of this cooperation:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{16} OSCE DCiP, 7-CSO/Journal No. 2, Annex 1, 7\textsuperscript{th} Meeting of the CSO, January 27–28, 1992.
\item \textsuperscript{17} Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, \textit{CSCE Missions}, September 1, 1992.
\item \textsuperscript{18} OSCE DCiP, CSCE/C/1-AM/Dec. 1, Summary of Conclusions, Helsinki Additional Meeting of the CSCE Council March 24, 1992.
\item \textsuperscript{19} OSCE DCiP, CSCE/C/1-AM/Dec. 1.
\item \textsuperscript{20} OSCE DCiP, Statement delivered by Minister of Foreign Affairs of the CSFR March 25, 1992.
\item \textsuperscript{22} V. Leška, \textit{KBSE/OBSE: minulost, přítomnost, perspektivy}, Karolinum, Ústav mezinárodních vztahů, Praha 1997, p. 125.
\end{itemize}
While the CSCE, NATO, and WEU structures clearly differ both in nature and in the modes of membership, questions of the appropriate interaction among the three is also critical and will have to be addressed sooner or later. Without any formal agreement, a sort of de facto division of duties in the security field is already developing … NATO should become one of the pillars of the CSCE, and the CSCE should broaden its power to help member countries respond constructively to problems and crises in Central and Eastern Europe. Developing cooperation between NATO and the CSCE could become the critical element of European politics in the years to come.23

The important CSCE mission to Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Nagorno-Karabakh under the leadership of Jiří Dienstbier took place from March 30 to April 3, 1992. In addition to Czechoslovak diplomats, representatives of Germany and Sweden took part (as representatives of the CSCE Troika consisting of the current, the previous, and next chairmanship country), as did the USA and Oldřich Andrášek, the representative of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.24 The NATO Secretariat coordinated the transport; Canada and the USA provided the planes.25 Dienstbier required a temporary cessation of hostilities in the region for the mission’s duration and called for an exchange of prisoners and hostages.26 His goal was to bring all parties to joint negotiations and agree on holding an international peace conference in Minsk. Dienstbier made every effort to convince Armenian and Azerbaijani politicians of the purpose of this conference. His visit fulfilled the declared objective: despite many different positions, the parties involved accepted the idea of preparing and holding a peace conference, indicating the political will to discuss concessions and seek a compromise.27

The CSCE Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting, 1992

Over three months (from March to July) of ongoing efforts by delegates of the CSCE Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting were devoted to preparing the final documents for the summit of the heads of state and prime ministers of the CSCE participating states at the beginning of July 1992 (Helsinki II). The Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting again confirmed but did not complete the CSCE’s transformation from process to structure. Furthermore, the delegates accepted as a central idea for the future the US-proposed theme of “managing change.”28 In the closing moments of the Follow-Up Meeting, a historic step was also taken

24 We draw from the list of mission participants attached to the letter that Dienstbier probably addressed to the ministers of foreign affairs of the CSCE participating states after returning from a visit to Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh.
26 Ibidem, p. 287.
when the CSO, following the consensus minus one mechanism, decided that no representative of Yugoslavia would be present at the Helsinki Summit or any other meetings until October 14, 1992, when the CSO was mandated to revisit this decision. Moreover, as part of the Second Plenary Meeting on March 24, 1992, the Treaty on Open Skies was signed by the participating states’ foreign affairs ministers. This treaty represented a significant milestone in the cooperative security field since it allowed participating states to conduct unarmed observation flights over the territory of other countries to foster inter-military transparency and cooperation.

In all, 63 formal proposals were introduced: 6 proposals in plenary, 14 in the working group on structures and institutions, 1 in the working group on military security, 26 in the working group on the human dimension, 11 in the working group on economic and environmental cooperation, and others.

The CSFR formulated its statements within the CSCE Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting and co-authored several proposals within individual working groups. The CSFR Head of the Delegation, František Janouch, addressed a critique in the plenary session on April 8, 1992, regarding the absence of the new participating states that had recently joined the CSCE but did not attend meetings, not even as interested parties when their affairs were discussed. The CSFR supported peacekeeping under the auspices of the CSCE being given more executive powers by strengthening the role of the CSCE Chairman-in-Office. Janouch also stated that the CSFR supported the institutionalization of the CSCE Troika, the establishment of the European Security Forum, and the need to develop a framework of “mutually interlocking international organizations and institutions.”

Czechoslovakia was also in the group of 15 states that, within Working Group 1, submitted a comprehensive proposal on the principal modalities of CSCE peacekeeping. According to this proposal, peacekeeping ought to include observation, monitoring, maintaining a ceasefire, providing a “buffer” to opposition forces, and providing humanitarian aid. The consent of the parties concerned was assumed, as was adherence to the principle of impartiality. The decision on such a mission also ought to contain a precisely defined mandate, financial arrangements, goals, duration, and the personnel composition of the mission. Other regional international organizations might be invited to join, on a case-by-case basis, to contribute to the operation, but with CSCE retaining political control and management. One member of the CSFR Delegation, Pavol

33 OSCE DCiP, Statement by the Head of the Delegation of the CSFR prof. František Janouch.
34 OSCE DCiP, CSCE/HM/WG1/1, Peacekeeping under the auspices of the CSCE – outline”, CSCE Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting 1992.
35 OSCE DCiP, CSCE/HM/WG1/1.
Hamžík, spent three and a half months in Helsinki and covered peacekeeping negotiations for Czechoslovakia. Hamžík described these negotiations as difficult because some feared that the results would go too far, and that peacekeeping would receive extensive powers. Also, some states, primarily Russia and the post-Soviet republics, worried that peacekeeping would allow interference in the internal affairs of participating states. According to Hamžík:

At that time, it looked like CSCE peacekeeping would obtain a larger scope than UN missions, even if their nature would be different. At that time, we did not yet know what the modalities of these missions would be. However, even then, the use of monitoring missions during the withdrawal of foreign troops was considered, as well as the compliance checks on humanitarian law, humanitarian supplies or ensuring internal order and legality, observing a ceasefire, or the registration of heavy weapons was implied.

The CSFR was an integral part of the group of participating states that submitted collective proposals in individual working groups. These proposals related to the peaceful settlement of disputes, nuclear security (considering this area as an integral part of the CSCE notion of cooperative security), urgent environmental assistance (so-called Green Helmets), and a call for participating states that had not yet done so to abolish the death penalty. Czechoslovakia appeared as a sponsor of a much larger number of collective proposals in the working groups. We would like to highlight the proposal in which Czechoslovakia, together with Norway and the Netherlands, claimed to support Roma communities, advocating non-discrimination and the need to create conditions for their social, educational, and cultural development.

The Czechoslovak delegation also commented on the financial matters discussed within Working Group 1. Their representative, Ivan Majerčín, in his statement of June 11, 1992, followed the opinion of Ján Kubiš, the CSO Chairman-in-Office, who said that the Follow-Up Meeting should also focus on matters related to logistical support and financing of CSCE missions and operations. Until then, any costs had been covered by the states directly involved in the mission. However, this was gradually becoming a less sustainable solution, as the number of such missions and their costs were growing significantly. Therefore, the CSFR proposed that individual CSCE bodies and their institutional budgets should cover the missions’ costs. Meanwhile, the CSO would calculate the costs necessary for the given mission on an ad hoc basis: 1) the budget of the CSCE
Secretariat should cover rapporteur missions to new participating states; 2) human rights missions should be covered by the budget of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR); 3) the Conflict Prevention Center (CPC) should cover missions that had the nature of security issues; and 4) transportation and all communication facilities should be provided commercially.\(^{40}\)

The Second CSCE Helsinki Summit, 1992

The efforts of participating states representatives' resulted in a summit of heads of state or government. To give new impetus to the security architecture of the northern hemisphere – which, after the fall of the Iron Curtain, faced new, unprecedented challenges – this symbolically took place in the birthplace of the Helsinki process.

The Czechoslovakian delegation consisted of 17 members, and 9 further persons were part of the other staff. In addition to President Václav Havel, Jiří Dienstbier had been succeeded as Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs by Jozef Moravčík; Karel Schwarzenberg took part as Chancellor of the President of the CSFR; František Janouch was the Head of Delegation to the Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting; and Ján Kubiš was Chairman of the CSO and General Director of the Euro-Atlantic Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.\(^{41}\)

All heads of state or government of the participating states gave addresses during the plenary session. Václav Havel, speaking as the president of the chairmanship country, noted that it was now becoming apparent how many problems had been sleeping under the blanket of communist unity; history that had seemed forgotten and overcome was coming to life again. Havel compared the post-communist world to a “melting pot” in which the fates of nations were melting.\(^{42}\) In this climate, the CSFR was still looking for its future modus vivendi and decoding whether its current form of existence, with which several generations of people had identified their lives, was not already obsolete. Havel also called for peaceful cooperation and the development of a new system that would satisfy not only the needs of the 21\(^{st}\) century but also the civilizational requirements of the planet. He also stated that it would be reasonable for the CSCE to gradually transform into an international organization that would bind its members with legal obligations and would have the right to sanction their non-compliance.\(^{43}\) Havel believed that the CSCE might become the main guarantor of peaceful coexistence, security, and democratic development in the northern hemisphere. Moreover, it might work as an essential framework for

\(^{40}\) OSCE DCiP, Statement of Mr. Ivan Majerčín, Deputy Head of Delegation, Working Group 1, Financial implication of despatching of CSCE missions.


\(^{43}\) OSCE DCiP, CSCE/HS/VR. 2.
pan-European unification. The optimistic attitude of the CSFR towards the Helsinki process was again expressed by Havel’s statement, in which he put hope in the transforming architecture of the CSCE and wished that the CSCE would give its bodies more powers and space for flexible decision-making and efficient functioning.44

The final document from the Second CSCE Helsinki Summit, *The Challenges of Change*, truly represented the exhaustive material and expressed the ambitions of branching out the structures, procedures, and mechanisms of CSCE functioning. At the summit, the heads of state or government declared the CSCE to be a regional arrangement in the sense of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.45 The document further developed structures to ensure the political management of crises, and created new instruments of conflict prevention, crisis management, and CSCE peacekeeping. It also strengthened the positions of the CM, the Troika, and the CSO. The CSCE’s capacities in the fields of “early warning” and “early action” would be strengthened through the activities of the newly established High Commissioner on National Minorities.46 The CSCE Helsinki Summit Document made official the creation of the institutions of the Forum for Security Cooperation and the Economic Forum.47

The Baltic states, for example Lithuania, appreciated § 15 of the Summit Declaration on withdrawing Russian troops from their territory.48 Furthermore, the participating States confirmed the temporary suspension of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from the CSCE in response to the Yugoslav crisis.49

**Conclusion**

This article has attempted to map the political-social context and circumstances of the CSFR Chairmanship of the CSCE between January and July 1992. We tried to analyze the political priorities and topics addressed by the CSFR representatives. We also sought to cover the most important events of this period from the perspective of the further development of the Helsinki process, and how Czechoslovak diplomacy and its representatives contributed to this.

Activity within the CSCE was one of the decisive priorities of Czechoslovakia’s post–November ’89 foreign policy. It was an essential part of the CSFR’s effort to create security guarantees in the new geopolitical conditions. The conflicts in Yugoslavia and Nagorno-Karabakh were significant tests of the CSCE’s capacity for action. The mechanism of “consensus minus one,” which the CSFR supported and which was approved at the Prague meeting of the CM, was used for the first time in the CSO declaration of May 12, 1992, regarding Bosnia

44 OSCE DCiP, CSCE/HS/VR. 2.
49 OSCE DCiP, HS/Journal No.1, 5th Plenary Meeting.
and Herzegovina. During this period, the CSCE was often accused of being unable to participate in resolving conflict situations. In reality, not even the UN or the EC acted as game-changers in the conflict phases in Yugoslavia or Nagorno-Karabakh.

The CSCE cannot even be compared with the UN or other regional organizations such as the EC or NATO, which at that time already had large apparatuses, budgets, and organizational and military infrastructure. Moreover, the CSCE was not even an international organization in the usual sense of the word – it had no international legal personality. President Havel, in his Prague and Helsinki statements, supported the transformation efforts of the CSCE bodies and, in this regard, inclined towards the idea of embedding the CSCE commitments in a treaty form to make them legally binding. However, this was not a universally accepted vision, as the introduction of legally binding status for some documents would presuppose a lengthy ratification process in the participating states.

Experience from the period of the CSFR Chairmanship demonstrated the absolute necessity of deepening cooperation and connecting existing international organizations with the CSCE. Jiří Dienstbier, as the CM Chairman-in-Office, often talked about the necessity of “integration of integrations” in his speeches. He pointed out that this higher degree of integration would save experts and foreign ministers a lot of their time and energy, as they often come together in similar compositions within different institutions. The consensus was that it would not be meaningful to create new institutions whose competencies would overlap with others. Instead, it would be more reasonable to use existing bodies’ expertise. On its own initiative, the Czechoslovak delegation sought at the meetings of all the bodies of the CSCE to create a system of interaction between all functioning European and transatlantic organizations. This was also why representatives of the UN, the Council of Europe, NATO, the UN Economic Commission for Europe, the WEU, the EC, and the OECD were invited to the Prague CM. The Prague Document on Further Development of CSCE Institutions and Structures, adopted on January 30, 1992, also reflected these efforts.

The Nagorno-Karabakh crisis also tested the potential of this institutional synergy. Kubíš and Dienstbier dispatched several missions to the South Caucasus, and each led one of them personally. The appointment of the Italian diplomat Mario Raffaeli as the chairman of the Minsk Conference, which led to the creation of the Minsk Group, was one of the direct legacies of the CSFR Chairmanship.

Within the CSCE Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting, the Czechoslovak delegates performed very actively; thanks to this, the CSFR became a co-author of several proposals within individual working groups. In addition, in this period, Czech representatives supported the proposal of Genscher, the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, to create a kind of European Security Council. Czechoslovakia was also a sponsor of a number of proposals, including the Franco-German proposal for the creation of a conciliation and arbitration court, a joint proposal of the Visegrád Troika to change the financial contribution scale of the CSCE
participating states, and a proposal for the creation of peacekeeping forces under CSCE auspices.\textsuperscript{50}

All this indicates that the Helsinki process was a top priority in Czechoslovak foreign policy at the beginning of the 1990s. After Helsinki II, despite all its imperfections, the CSCE became the seed of a security system with a more concrete component of “preventive diplomacy.” The CSFR intended to portray itself as a reliable and responsible partner of Western countries, with the aspiration to participate in building a new political architecture after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Czechoslovak diplomacy, also thanks to its prominent leaders, had high hopes for this process; although in practice, further political developments brought other trajectories and opportunities.

\section*{Bibliography}

Augustin M., \textit{Interview with Pavol Hamžík, a member of the CSFR delegation at the CSCE in 1992}, February 2, 2022.


\textsuperscript{50} Z. Matějka, \textit{Československo a KBSE}, June 1, 1992, p. 11–12.

OSCE DCiP, CSCE/HM/WG1/1, Peacekeeping under the auspices of the CSCE – outline”, CSCE Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting 1992.

OSCE DCiP, CSCE/HM/WG1/2, Peaceful settlements of disputes, April 9, 1992.

OSCE DCiP, CSCE/HM/WG3/26, Promotion of Equal Opportunities for Persons belonging to Romani and Traveller Communities, June 17, 1992


OSCE DCiP, Statement by H.E. Václav Havel, President of the CSFR.


OSCE DCiP, Statement of Mr. Ivan Majerčín, Deputy Head of Delegation, Working Group 1, Financial implication of despatching of CSCE missions.

